Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?
By David B. Kopel,1 Paul Gallant2 & Joanne D. Eisen3
No one has a legal duty to be a victim of genocide. The statement is indisputable
not only as a moral principle and as a matter of natural law, but also as a clear rule of
positive international law.
It is also clear, as a general principle of legal interpretation, and as a positive rule
of international human rights law, that there can be no right without a remedy. Indeed, a
right with no effective means of enforcement would merely be a nominal right, not an
actual one. Surely the right not to be a victim of genocide should be a strongly enforced
right, not just a pretend right.
In this Article, we explore various methods of enforcement of anti-genocide law,
with particular reference to the conintuing genocide in Darfur, Sudan. That the genocide
has been occurring since August 2003, is well-known throughout the civilized world.
Never in human history has a genocide-in-progress been so visible. Yet the United
Nations and the rest of the international community have refused to take action to stop it.
The inaction suggests that there are fatal (literally) deficiencies in the anti- genocide
mechanisms currently favored by the United Nations.
The first half of this Article, Parts I through III, details the catastrophic
inadequacy of current anti-genocide remedies. Part I shows how non-violent economic
and other sanctions have failed. Part II examines the lack of success on the part of
multilateral “peacekeeping” forces, such as the United Nations’ Standby High Readiness
Brigade (SHIRBRIG), or the Standby Force of the African Union. Part III acknowledges
that unilateral military action by states acting in their own self-interest has sometimes
stopped a genocide in progress; however, such unilateral action is considered illegal
according to the predominant interpretations of the United Nations Charter.
The second half of this Article examines an alternative approach. Under
international law there must be an effective remedy to genocide. Given that the
international community has manifestly failed—and is, as we write, continuing to fail—
to prevent genocide, there must be some other anti-genocide remedy which is genuinely
effective. Our alternative remedy focuses on empowering genocide victims, rather than
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asking them to wait helplessly until the international community rescues them; waiting
for the United Nations to act is often just as futile as waiting for Godot, and hundreds of
thousands or millions of people die while waiting. (In this article, we use the term
“genocide victims” to refer to the spectrum of the entire targeted group. So when we
speak about empowering “genocide victims,” we are referring to members of the targeted
group who might still be saved, rather than to members who have already been
murdered.)
Part IV points out that civilian armament has historically been very effective at
preventing genocide. Indeed, genocide scholars have found that genocides are carried out
almost exclusively against populations which have first been systematically disarmed.
Because genocidal regimes consider prior disarmament the sine qua non for beginning a
genocide, it seems indisputable that civilian armament deters genocide in most cases. Part
IV considers the practical possibilities of arming the Darfur genocide victims.
In Part V, we carefully analyze the international law implications of arming
genocide victims. Genocide victims who acquired arms, and persons who supplied arms
to genocide victims, would almost certainly be in violation of the gun control laws in the
country where the genocide was taking place. In addition, the arms acquisition might
violate international treaties against bringing arms into a nation without the consent of the
national government. Under international law, could the genocide victims and their arms
suppliers claim that their actions were nevertheless legal? We answer “yes.”
To begin with, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the existence
of a universal, individual right of self-defense, and also of a right to revolution against
tyranny. Many other international human rights instruments recognize similar rights, and
also a right to life. The various international human rights instruments also recognize that
people have a right to an effective remedy to protect their human rights. Taken in
conjunction with Anglo-American human rights law, the human rights instruments can be
read to reflect a customary or general international law recognizing a right of armed
resistance by genocide victims.
More specifically, the Genocide Convention, which is binding, positive
international law, establishes an affirmative duty of its signatory nations to “prevent”
genocide. When the case of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia was brought before the International
Court of Justice, Judge Lauterpacht’s opinion stated that the U.N. Security Council’s
arms embargo violated the Genocide Convention. Although the embargo was facially
neutral, its effect was to leave genocide victims defenseless against genocide
perpetrators. Because the Genocide Convention is jus cogens (a peremptory rule of
international law which takes precedence over other international or national laws), the
Genocide Convention took precedence over the Security Council resolution. Therefore,
the arms embargo was void as a matter of international law, to the extent that the
embargo interfered with arms acquisition by Bosnians who were potential genocide
victims.
Thus, as Judge Lauterpacht recognized, a facially neutral arms control law is void
to the extent that it conflicts with the Genocide Convention by making the possession and
acquisition of arms by genocide victims illegal. Accordingly, no law-abiding state, or
group of states, should violate the Genocide Convention by following the unlawful
dictates of victim disarmament laws. Similarly, no law-abiding court anywhere in the
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world should violate the Genocide Convention by giving force to victim disarmament
laws.
Part VI applies the principles of Bosnia v. Yugoslavia and the Genocide
Convention to some contemporary legal issues. First, Sudan’s highly restrictive gun
licensing law, which in effect prohibits gun acquisition by the Darfur victims, is invalid
(as applied to the Darfur victims, not in general).
Second, the United Nations Security Council has imposed an arms embargo on
the transfer of arms to groups within Sudan, and to the Sudanese dictatorship in
Khartoum. Because the embargo maintains the status quo of the enormous military
superiority of the Sudanese government and its proxies (the Arab Janjaweed militias), it
is a violation of the Genocide Convention to enforce the embargo against the black
genocide victims in Darfur.
In 2005, the UN’s Protocol against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in
Firearms became legally binding on signatory states.4 The Protocol imposes requirements
for various controls on the manufacturing, record-keeping, and transfer of firearms. The
Protocol also recognizes “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence” and
of “self-determination of all peoples.” The best reading of the Protocol is that the
ordinarily-applicable controls do not apply when their enforcement would conflict with
the inherent rights of self-defense and self-determination.
To the extent that the Protocol might interfere with self-defense by genocide
victims in the Sudan or elsewhere, the Protocol must give way to the jus cogens selfdefense norm of the Genocide Convention. Additionally, any future international treaty
restricting cross-border arms transfers should include an exception for genocide
resistance. Even without an explicit exception, the jus cogens status of the Genocide
Convention would prohibit any restrictions on arms transfers to genocide victims.
Finally, we examine the broader implications of the universal human right to
resist genocide. For example, the Sudanese government has until very recently been
committing genocide against the Christian and Animist Africans in southern Sudan.
Although the south Sudan genocide has stopped, would it be prudent for international law
to recognize a continuing right of the south Sudanese victims to acquire defensive arms—
especially since the events in western Sudan (Darfur) demonstrate that the Sudanese
government has not abandoned genocide as an instrument of state policy?
More broadly, because it is usually difficult to predict, over the long term, where
genocide will take place, it could be argued that anti-genocide principles should lead to
the recognition of a right of all peoples to possess arms for resisting genocide—rather
than recognition of the right only when genocide has already begun. At the least, would it
be sensible to recognize the right in nations which have many of the immediate
precursors of genocide—such as undemocratic rule, suppression of the free press, and
active incitement of hatred against minority groups? The extension of an anti- genocide
right to arms could, in some cases, cause problems because of increased misuse of arms;
however, the human disaster of genocide is so enormous that any policywhi ch prevented
or drastically reduced world-wide genocide would result in an extremely large net gain
for personal security and human rights.
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In this Article, we address only the issue of the fundamental human right to resist
genocide. We do not argue for or against an international human right to possess arms for
other purposes—such as hunting, target shooting, gun collecting, self-defense against
lone criminals, or self-defense against governments which are criminal but not genocidal.

I. Non-Violent Coercions: Sanctions
The United States government has imposed extremely comprehensive economic
sanctions on Sudan. An American in Khartoum cannot even use a credit card to buy
lunch at a restaurant, because the credit card’s American host bank is forbidden to
process the transaction. In compliance with the sanctions, state government pension funds
are being forced to divest their holdings in companies that do business in Sudan.5
Most of the rest of the world, however, has decided to continue commercial
relationships with Sudan, notwithstanding the genocide. For example, several European
airlines offer non-stop flights to Khartoum. European oil companies have formed joint
ventures with the Sudanese government to explore for oil in eastern Sudan. At the United
Nations, the French government has been especially adamant against restrictions on
business with Sudan, for fear of lessening France’s traditionally important commercial
influence in Africa.
In Darfur, as innocent black Africans were under attack, and women and children
were dying, the UN Security Council could not even agree to include the word
“sanctions” in its resolution 1556 of July 30, 2004.6 Because of the veto threats from
China and Russia, the UN’s September 18, 2004, Resolution 15647 took no action other
than to merely threaten the use of sanctions against Sudan’s oil industry and individual
Sudanese officials.8 Nor could the UN prioritize the $200 million in funds estimated to be
required “to save the lives of” the displaced population of Darfur.9
Yet even if the United Nations were truly united in a sanctions policy on Sudan,
history suggests that sanctions would be unlikely to stop the genocide.
According to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, “The only real
disagreement in the contemporary sanctions literature relates to the degree to which
sanctions fail as an instrument for coercing changes in the behaviour of target states. No
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study argues that sanctions are in general an effective means of coercion, although
individual sanctions regimes can and sometimes do succeed.”10
Comprehensive sanctions—such as a total prohibition on all trade with a
particular nation—have been used against rogue regimes that violate human rights.
However, those sanctions are sometimes more destructive to the victim population than
to the regime in power; sanctions also may harm the populations of non-sanctioned states
because of the reduction of trade.11
More recently, the UN has attempted to design specific “targeted” or “smart”
sanctions which would affect only the wrong-doers. Thinking about sanctions has
become a big business in the international community. The UN has created the Interlaken
Process to study and refine financial sanctions. There is a Bonn/Berlin Process for travel
sanctions and arms embargoes. The Stockholm Process takes the Interlaken and
Bonn/Berlin proposals and looks for ways to make their implementation more effective.12
The sanctions advocates have done a good job of political marketing; everyone is
naturally inclined to be for a program which is “smart”, “selective” and “targeted.”
Nevertheless, as socialist pacifist authors David Cortright and George A. Lopez observe,
“the success record of selective measures is ambiguous.”13
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A. The Interlaken Process
The Interlaken Process, named for its host town in Switzerland, is a UN-led
program initiated in 1998 to refine knowledge on targeted sanctions, especially financial
ones.14 But as Kimberly Ann Elliott has observed, “In general, the problem with trying to
extend the targeted approach to financial flows is that the more targeted the sanctions are,
the easier they will be to evade.”15
Because money is (mostly) fungible, unless global society unanimously agrees to
a particular set of targeted financial sanctions, and effectively enforces those sanctions,
the selected target will be easily able to circumvent the sanctions.16 If just one ordinary
state will maintain ordinary financial relations with the pariah state, the pariah state has
de facto access to worldwide financial resources.
Even were it possible to achieve unanimous enforcement of financial sanctions, a
great deal of time would be required to build the international agreement. The negotiating
time provides a large window of opportunity for the potentially targeted state to start
hiding and dispersing its financial assets, and begin cultivating relationships in the black
market financial network. Indeed, the existence of the Interlaken Process itself has
already alerted some guilty parties that they should diligently investigate novel ways of
hiding their financial dealings. According to Elliott, “it seems likely that potential targets
are already taking steps to protect themselves from any future sanctions.”17
Five years into the Interlaken Process, Cortright and Lopez stated: “The
development of financial sanctions theory currently outpaces the development of
practical systems to implement these sanctions.”18
Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull summarized:
[T]he optimism expressed in some academic circles and among decision
makers at national and international levels appears largely unjustified.
While smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and conceptually
attractive at face value, they are no panacea. The operational problems—
due to persistent technical inadequacies, legal loopholes, institutional
weaknesses, budgetary and staff scarcities, and political constraints—are
daunting.19
B. The Bonn-Berlin Process
The Bonn-Berlin Process was intended to redesign travel sanctions and arms
embargoes to ameliorate earlier failings. According to Michael Brozska, “Arms
14
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embargoes and travel and aviation sanctions are attractive because they are less blunt
than comprehensive economic sanctions, but often they have had little or no discernible
effect on the target.”20 It would be gratifying to many in the world community if the
success of these sanctions could be realized. Can they be designed to target individuals
guilty of human rights abuses, and cause them to change their objectionable behavior
without also harming the innocent?
1. Travel Sanctions
According to Laura Norris and Jacqueline Simon, travel sanctions have symbolic
value. And “they do not generally have, or have not had, unwanted negative humanitarian
side effects.”21 Thus, travel sanctions are less politically controversial, and it is relatively
easy to gain consensus and implement them. Travel sanctions can be as minor as
restricting travel of a few specified individuals; for example, a dictator and his major
advisors might be prohibited from entering European Union nations.22 Travel sanctions
can also be as severe as total prohibitions on international travel; the targeted country’s
airlines can be banned from the airspace of the sanctioning countries, and the sanctioning
countries can prohibit their own airlines (and ships and trains) from entering the targeted
country. Nevertheless, the potential for unintended adverse consequences exists.
Richard W. Conroy explains: “The evidence suggests that travel sanctions reduce
humanitarian costs but they do not entirely eliminate humanitarian consequences...nor
should travel sanctions be expected to work on their own.”23 Gary Hufbauer and Barbara
Oegg point out that an international flight ban can prevent a nation’s aircraft from being
serviced at foreign airports; as a result, the entire national commercial air fleet may be
grounded, and relief workers may find it impossible to travel within the country, as
domestic flights also cease.24
20

Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of
the ‘Bonn-Berlin Process’, Bonn International Center for Conversion (Michael Brzoska ed., 2001), at 10,
http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/2000/pdf/booklet/booklet_sanctions.pdf.
21
Laura Norris & Jacqueline Simon, Conference Discussion Summary Report, Smart Sanctions, The Next
Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions – Improving their Effectiveness (1999), at 3, Bonn
International Center for Conversion, http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/1999/pdf/sanctionssummary.pdf.
22
In 2003, France defied European Union travel sanctions in order to host a visit of Zimbabwe’s massmurdering tyrant Robert Mugabe and his retinue. Jon Henley, Tension Surrounds Mugabe Visit, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,900001,00.html.
23
Richard W. Conroy, The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions, in
SMART SANCTIONS, supra note 13, at 163-64.
24
Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 10. Hufbauer and Oegg elaborated:
The assumption that flight bans exert minimal humanitarian impact may not hold. In
August 1996, the Security Council voted to impose a flight ban on the government of
Sudan for its suspected support of international terrorism. Implementation of the ban was
delayed, however, and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs subsequently issued a
report on its possible humanitarian effects. The report showed that even a selective flight
ban could cause humanitarian suffering. Since the Sudanese airline relies on international
airports for its aircraft maintenance, a selective ban might have grounded the entire
airline. This in turn would have created severe problems for relief organizations that rely
on the airline to reach remote areas of the country. Taking these considerations into
account, the UN Security Council never implemented the flight ban.

7

Travel sanctions on government officials may sometimes be circumvented, such
as by using false identification documents. After all, the targeted governments usually
have a secret police capable of producing or buying high-quality false foreign passports
and similar documents.
As Conroy pointed out, it is difficult to assess the success of travel sanctions.25
After seven years of UN sanctions on Libyan travel, the Qaddafi dictatorship announced
that it was giving up its weapons of mass destruction. Kofi Annan, referring to the Libyan
travel sanctions, said “I prefer to think it played a role.”26 One can understand why a UN
official would “prefer to think” that the UN deserved credit. But Elliott disagreed that
“the relatively minor inconveniences”27 of UN travel sanctions changed Qaddafi’s heart
after seven years. Rather, “His desire to attract additional foreign investment was perhaps
a more important factor in his decision than the relatively minor inconveniences imposed
by the travel sanctions.”28
2. Arms Embargoes
On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council imposed an arms embargo
on non-government groups in Darfur, Sudan— namely the Darfur rebels fighting for
independence, and the Arab Janjaweed militias which have been raping and massacring
civilians in Darfur.29 In March 2005, the Security Council affirmed the prior embargo and
extended it to cover the central government in Khartoum.30
In general, arms embargoes have not been successful.31 According to Cortright
and Lopez, “arms embargoes have been empty gestures”32 because of non-existent or
weak enforcement. As Loretta Bondi stated, “The unwillingness of member states to
provide the financial resources that would make arms embargoes viable makes these bans
toothless gestures.”33 Academics such as Cortright, Lopez, and Bondi detail numerous
reasons for the failures of arms embargoes, but insist that we only need to work harder to
make them effective. Bondi suggested that:
such bans, if properly enacted, implemented, and enforced, offer the
international community a powerful tool to lessen abuses…Nor should a
decade of intensive experience with arms embargoes lead to
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pessimism…Rather, this accumulated experience should pave the way to
more radical innovations and courageous thinking.34
Others35 have echoed this sentiment.36
However, the path is a dead end. As R. Richard Newcomb noted, “if money is
available, goods will be smuggled.”37 Elliott pointed out “the enormous profit potential
involved in moving arms from where they are in surplus to where they are in demand, an
incentive that usually increases when embargoes are imposed….”38
Bondi acknowledges that black markets in arms flourish because of the “flawed
design” of embargoes.39 But she cannot suggest a methodology to eliminate those flaws.
Nor can anyone suggest a realistic plan to eliminate black markets in which governments,
with their enormous financial resources, are the buyers.
Another flaw in arms embargoes is that they sometimes lead to inequities on the
ground. In Bosnia, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 713, calling for a
“general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to
Yugoslavia” (meaning rump Yugoslavia, plus Croatia and Slovenia). After the embargo
was enacted, Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia. Although sovereign nations are normally
expected to acquire and own arms, Resolution 713 defined Bosnian weapons as illicit.
Thus, the unarmed non-Serb population was denied their legitimate right to self-defense.
In effect, the UN deprived Bosnia of its right to self-defense, a right guaranteed under
Article 51 of the UN Charter.40 Because the Serbs possessed most of the old Yugoslavian
34
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army’s weaponry, the embargo froze the status quo of their military superiority over the
Bosnians, and thereby allowed the Serbs to perpetrate genocide against Bosnia.41
When we tally the cost of arms embargoes, we need to include in that equation the
deaths of Bosnians, the people of Darfur, and other people who might have lived if they
had easier access to the means of their survival. We will examine the issue in more detail,
infra, in parts V-VI.

II. Coercion Involving the Use of Force: A UN Constabulary
In Part V, we will discuss in detail The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention obligates signatory states to
“prevent” genocide. One of the ways a state may attempt to fulfill the obligation is
specified in article VIII, which provides that contracting parties may “call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any other acts enumerated in article 3.”42
In September 2004, the United States government explicitly invoked the
Genocide Convention to “call upon” the United Nations to stop the genocide in Sudan.
The call by the United States was the only time any party to the Genocide Convention has
ever invoked the Genocide Convention to call upon the United Nations Security Council
to take action against a genocide.43
Of course, one of the difficulties of “calling upon” the United Nations to act is
that a genocidal government has just as much of a voice in the United Nations as does a
non-genocidal government. For example, Sudan itself is one of fifteen nations which
currently has a seat on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Another government
with a seat is Zimbabwe, which is currently perpetrating genocide by starvation against
tribes which have objected to the Mugabe dictatorship.44 Cuba and Communist China are
among the other nations who sit on the Commission, supposedly to promote human rights
around the world, notwithstanding their own atrocious record on human rights.

any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
UN Charter, art. 51. See generally William C. Bradford, "The Duty To Defend Them": A Natural Law
Justification for the Bush Doctrine Of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2004).
41
See Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, When Policy Kills, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan 27, 2002,
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel012703.asp.
42
U.N. “organs” include not just the Security Council and the General Assembly, but also the Economic
and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Each of
these organs may have subordinate bodies; for example, the Commission on Human Rights is a subordinate
of the Economic and Social Council. Four U.N. organs (either directly, or through subordinate organs) took
some form of action during the Rwanda genocide: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Secretariat, and the Economic and Social Council. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 453 (2000). Obviously none of the organs took the slightest effective action to save any of the
genocide victims.
43
Scott Straus, What’s in a Name? 84 FOR. AFF. 123 (Jan.-Feb. 2005).
44
David B. Kopel, Dailies ignoring Zimbabwe crisis, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2002,
http://www.davekopel.com/Media/RMN/2002/Zimbabwe.htm; David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne
Eisen, Ripe for Genocide, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2001,
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel021301.shtml.
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Referring to Rwanda and Bosnia, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in
January 2004: “And yet, genocide has happened again, in our time. And States even
refused to call it by its name, to avoid fulfilling their obligations.”45 Yet by then, the
genocide in Darfur had already commenced. Still, the United Nations refused to called
genocide by its name.46 Other than the United States government, no other government in
the world has used the word “genocide” to describe what is going on in Sudan.
A January 25, 2005 UN report47 did admit that the atrocities rose to the level of
“crimes against humanity” and suggested, among other things, reparations to the victims.
Kofi Annan responded: “What is vital is that these people are indeed held accountable.
Such grave crimes cannot be committed with impunity. That would be a terrible betrayal
of the victims, and of potential victims in Darfur and elsewhere.”48
We share Secretary-General Annan’s hopes that the perpetrators of the Darfur
genocide will be punished, and the surviving victims will eventually be compensated.
However, post hoc prosecution and compensation cannot ameliorate the failure to stop a
genocide while it can be stopped. By evading the word “genocide,” the UN evaded the
affirmative duty of all signatories of the Genocide Convention, and of the UN itself, “to
prevent” genocide.
Among the U.N. organs which a state may “call upon” to stop a genocide is the
Security Council, which has the power to authorize the use of force. The working groups
of the Stockholm Process49 did not shy away from acknowledging the option of armed
humanitarian intervention.50

45

See UN Press Release SG/SM/9126, Genocide is Threat to Peace Requiring Strong, United Action,
Secretary-General Tells Stockholm International Forum, Jan. 26, 2004.
46
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. The UN Report on Darfur stated, among other
things: “it is clear from the Commission’s findings that most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately
directed against civilians….International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that
have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.” See also UN
Commission finds Sudanese Government responsible for crimes in Darfur, UN NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 1, 2005
(“Summarizing the 177-page report, Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the Security Council today to
consider possible sanctions over what the Commission called ‘serious violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law’.”),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=13199.
47
Id.
48
UN Press Release SG/SM/9700 AFR/1101, Feb. 01, 2005.
49
See The Stockholm Process, Executive Summary, Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for
the Implementation of UN Policy Option,
http://www.smartsanctions.se/stockholm_process/reports/Exec_summary.pdf.
50
See Saban Kardas, Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis, 2 ALTERNATIVES (2003),
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number3and4/kardas.pdf:
Defined as forcible action by a state, a group of states or international organizations to
prevent or end gross violations of human rights on behalf of the nationals of the target
state, through the use or threat of armed force without the consent of the target
government, with or without UN Security Council authorization, humanitarian
intervention has been one of the controversial topics in international law, political science
and moral philosophy.
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Unfortunately, previous UN peacekeeping51 missions have not successfully
protected victim populations, and they have occasionally failed even to protect
themselves.52 For example, Dutch peacekeepers under UN control, hampered by a limited
mandate and an insufficient force, were attacked and taken as hostages in Bosnia. They
were impotent in preventing the slaughter that occurred in 1995 in Srebrenica.53
The U.N. cannot claim ignorance of what happens when victims are abandoned to
their oppressors. The Srebrenica scenario is reminiscent of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,
when promises by the U.N. to protect Rwandan civilians proved empty. There, too, U.N.
personnel knew that the victim groups had been previously disarmed—in this case, by
laws enacted in 1964 and 1979. Early on in the genocide, thousands of Rwandan civilians
gathered in areas where U.N. troops had been stationed, thinking they would be
protected. They were not. If the Rwandans had known that the U.N. troops would
withdraw, they would have fled, and some might have survived. “The manner in which
troops left, including attempts to pretend to the refugees that they were not in fact
leaving, was disgraceful,” a report later concluded.54
More recently, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UN peacekeepers withdrew
in the face of violence.55 According to UN spokesman Fred Eckhard, “The mandate was
not to make war. The mandate was based on a peace agreement. Here, the peace
agreement has been violently breached. It’s for the parties to sort out. Once they can sort
51

See What is Peacekeeping?, United Nations Peacekeeping: Meeting New Challenges,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm. The UN defines “peacekeeping”:
Peacekeeping is a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable
peace. UN peacekeepers—soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and
civilian personnel from many countries—monitor and observe peace processes that
emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace
agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including
confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support,
strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development.

Note that “peacekeeping,” according to UN terminology, does not involve rescuing civilians from violence
and refers only to “post-conflict” situations where peace has presumably already been established.
“Keeping” an existing peace is not the same as creating peace.
52
See, e.g., DENNIS C. JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS xii (1999). See also Srebrenica: A ‘Safe Area’:
Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area, Netherlands Institute
for War Documentation, http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/a_index.htm.
53
See Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, When Policy Kills, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2003,
http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel012703.asp. See also Srebrenica: A ‘Safe Area’, Netherlands
Institute for War Documentation (2002), http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/; Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 42, ¶ 490, U.N.
Doc. A/54/549 (1999), http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/UNsrebrenicareport.htm.
54
Ingvar Carlsso, Han Sung-Joo & Rufus M. Kupolati, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions
of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, New York, Dec. 15, 1999,
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/RwandaReport1.htm (visited May 17, 2005), §12.
55
This led to an unfortunate occurrence. Because of civilian anger and an ensuing demonstration against
the UN, three people were shot dead by UN peacekeepers. See UN Troops Open Fire in Kinshasa, BBC
NEWS, Jun. 3, 2004 (According to UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Marie Guehenno, “Our troops had, as a last
resort, to open fire.”). There are many disturbing report of peacekeepers involved in the rape of women and
the sexual exploitation of children. See, e.g., Kate Holt, DR Congo’s Shameful Sex Secret, BBC NEWS,
June 3, 2004.
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out their differences and reaffirm their peace agreement, then there’s a role for the UN.
When war breaks out, the role of peacekeepers ends.”56
We cannot fault the Security Council’s imperfect mandates; more forceful
mandates would involve the UN in wars it could not hope to win. Although Kofi Annan
requested an additional 13,100 troops for the Congo,57 it is not likely he will get them
because of monetary constraints. And even if the additional troops were deployed, it is
unlikely that even the augmented troops would be able to take on a combat role and
pacify the area. 58
The oxymoron of “U.N. protection” was also illustrated in Sierra Leone in May
2000. As Dennis Jett explained in his book Why Peacekeeping Fails, Sierra Leone
“nearly became the UN's biggest peacekeeping debacle” when 500 peacekeepers there
were taken hostage by the barbaric rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).59
Jett observed: “The RUF troops are unspeakably brutal to civilians, but will not stand up
to any determined military force. Yet the UN peacekeepers, with few exceptions, handed
over their weapons including armored personnel carriers and meekly became prisoners.”
It was only the deployment of British troops to the former colony that saved civilian lives
and averted a “complete U.N. defeat.”
Lakhdar Brahimi analyzed the problems of the present system of UN
peacekeeping operations and made numerous recommendations60 that fall short of a
permanent UN constabulary because the creation of such a force is problematic: big
countries are reluctant to cede power to the UN, while smaller countries which abuse
human rights are afraid that a UN force could be used against them.61
56

Susannah Price, Peacekeepers ‘Powerless’ in DR Congo, BBC NEWS, Jun. 3, 2004.
See Annan Gets Half the Peacekeepers He Needs for Congo, BUS. DAY (Johannesburg), Oct. 4, 2004.
58
Nor would one expect that the UN would be able to prevent the ongoing mini-genocide against the DR
Congo’s pygmies. See DR Congo Pygmies ‘Exterminated’, BBC NEWS, Jul. 6, 2004. (“The International
Criminal Court is being urged to investigate ‘a campaign of extermination’ against pygmies in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.”)
59
DENNIS JETT, WHY PEACEKEEPING FAILS (N.Y.: Palgrave, 2001).
The RUF has been described by Human Rights Watch as a “barbarous group of thugs,” who “lived
off the country’s rich diamond fields and terrorized the population with its signature atrocity of chopping
off arms and hands of men, women and often children.” Kenneth Roth, International Injustice: The
Tragedy of Sierra Leone, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Aug. 2, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2000/ken-slaug.htm.
60
See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809,
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/full_report.htm (also known as the Brahimi
Report). See also William J. Durch, UN Peace Operations and the “Brahimi Report”, Oct. 2001 Revision,
available at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/peaceopsbr1001.pdf.
61
As Kofi Annan explained:
57

There is also a resistance from the big powers that they do not want to give the UN or the
Secretary-General that capacity but the resistance doesn't only come from them. Some of
the smaller ones do not want to have a standing army which can be used against them on
the basis that they are either abusing their people, say humanitarian reasons, or they are
not doing what they ought to do. So you have, let me say, general uneasiness about
giving the UN a standing army.
Question and Answer Session Following Statement (SG/SM/7741) at the United Services Institution of
India, (unofficial transcript), Off the Cuff Remarks to the Press and the Public, New Delhi, Mar. 15, 2001,
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=158. See also Saul Mendlovitz & John Fousek, A UN
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Many people hope that a volunteer permanent rapid deployment force that would
be available immediately might succeed,62 despite the past failures of U.N. peacekeepers,
who had been borrowed from member-states which supplied them reluctantly and
belatedly. Peter Langille described just such a force:
It would be permanent, based at a designated UN site, with two mobile
field headquarters. It thus could move to quell an emergency within 48
hours after authorization from the UN Security Council. With individuals
recruited from the best volunteers worldwide, it would not suffer the
reluctance of UN members to deploy their own national units. With
14,000 personnel, carefully selected, expertly trained and well-equipped, it
would not fail in its mission due to a lack of preparation, skills or
enthusiasm to engage in robust operations.63
Peter Langille likened a UN constabulary force to a 911 emergency system.64 He
articulated the growing frustration of many in the world community: “Despite evidence
of ongoing ethnic cleansing, gang rape, mass murder and, once again, early official
reluctance to even mention the word ‘genocide’ with reference to Darfur, the ‘never
again’ promise now echoes back as ‘again’ and ‘again’.” Although a 911 system is
sometimes useful, even the sophisticated 911 system in the United States rarely results in
the rescue of victims from harm during a violent crime, because police can almost never
get to the scene of a crime during the seconds the victims are most in need.65
Peter Langille’s UN-run humanitarian intervention might take months to arrive—
if at all. Such waiting is not an option for people who are trying to survive until the next
morning. As Langille himself admitted, “By their nature, emergencies usually require
prompt, reliable and effective responses. Such a response is, alas, unlikely.”66
Constabulary to Enforce the Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in PROTECTION AGAINST
GENOCIDE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 118-20 (Neal Riemer ed., 2000)(discussion of some of the difficulties
involved in creating a force under the direct control of the Security Council.).
62
See Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force, N.Y REV. OF BOOKS, JUNE 10, 1993 (“There
will certainly be future conflicts in which an early display of strength by the Security Council will be
needed if later disasters are to be prevented….Clearly, a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly
trained force, willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the international
community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis.”). Urquhart, former Under
Secretary-General of the UN, admits that without such a force, the UN is merely a paper tiger. Id.
63
Peter Langille, Preventing Genocide: Time for a UN 911, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2004/1019timefor.htm. See also Brian Urquhart,
The United Nations’ Capacity for Peace Enforcement, http://www.iisd.org/security/unac/urqudoc.htm;
John G. Heidenrich, HOW TO PREVENT GENOCIDE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS, SCHOLARS, AND THE
CONCERNED CITIZEN 233-50 (2001); Michael J. Smith, Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Is There a
Universal Policy?, HARV. INT’L REV. (Fall 2000) 76 (“It seems obvious that a standing force at the disposal
of the UN Security Council could help. An international policing force has the potential to make a huge
difference in our capacity to prevent genocide.”).
In the United States, a person may make an emergency phone call to request police assistance by
dialing the digits 9-1-1.
64
See Peter Langille, Preventing Genocide: Time for a UN 911, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 11, 2005.
65
See David Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen, 911 Is a Joke... or Is It? Let's Find Out, TECH CENT.
STATION, Jan. 05, 2005, http://www.techcentralstation.com/010505H.html.
66
See Langille, Preventing Genocide, supra note 64
.
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Even if we hypothesize the creation of a directly controlled UN force, that force
would only act when the UN decided. The track record of recent deployments of UNdirected forces should cause skepticism that the UN would actually use its military power
to stop a genocide in progress.
1. SHIRBRIG
One UN force is SHIRBRIG (the United Nations’ Standby High Readiness
Brigade), created by a Dutch-Danish initiative in 1994.67 SHIRBRIG was declared
available to the UN in early 2000. Its first deployment came that year, after Ethiopia and
Eritrea forged a peace agreement and consented to a UN peacekeeping force to be
deployed to the border area. Security Council Resolution 1320, of September 15, 2000,
mandated that the force “monitor the cessation of hostilities.”68 The UN Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea was authorized until September 15, 2005; its current strength is
3,345 military personnel.69
The UNMEE mandate does not include the protection of civilians, and does not
extend beyond the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. While the UNMEE troops were deployed on
Ethiopia’s northern border(with Eritrea), the Ethiopia government was committing, with
UN knowledge, genocide against the Anuak70 people in the southwestern state of

67

See Backgrounder: The Origins and Status of SHIRBRIG, Feb. 10, 1999, Department of National
Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CF),
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=792. (“SHIRBRIG is an initiative for a multinational brigade-sized force to be drawn, when required, from the UN Standby Arrangements System.
Upon activation by the UN, it would be comprised of four to five thousand peacekeeping troops….Current
participants include Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Spain, and Sweden.”). See also SHIRBRIG: Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for
United Nations Operations, Presidency, SHIRBRIG Steering Committee, MOD Norway (undated
document), for a more detailed description of SHIRBRIG and its operational components,
http://www.odin.dep.no/archive/fdvedlegg/01/01/Shirb044.pdf.
68
See Ethiopia and Eritrea – UNMEE – Mandate, United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/mandate.html.
69
See UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea – Facts and Figures,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/facts.html (visited 5/18/05).
70
See Nyikaw Ochalla & Deidre D’Entremont, Oil Development in Ethiopia: A Threat to the Anuak of
Gambela, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Oct. 31, 2001 (brief history of the Anuak people). See also Violence in
Gambella: An Overview (undated document),
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/news_updates/art7332.html (“The conflict is raging
between the Anuak, an indigenous people who have always lived in Gambella, and the highlanders, a local
term for Ethiopians who have moved to the Gambella region of western Ethiopia within the past 20
years.”); Nyikaw Ochalla, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Against the Anuak in Gambela State, Ethiopia,
July 16, 2003, http://www.ethiomedia.com/release/anuak_genocide.html (“The ongoing massacre of
unarmed Anuak civilians at Itang and its surroundings by the armed forces that claim to fight the regional
and federal regimes in the country is devastating the entire Gambela state…The massacre of the innocent
women, children, men, and elderly at Itang district is a part of an indirect ethnic cleansing and genocide by
both the government in power and the armed rebels movements against the indigenous Anuak people in
their own territories.”); Genocide Watch: The Anuak of Ethiopia, GenocideWatch.org, Jan. 23, 2004
(“Genocide Watch has received numerous reports of genocidal massacres of Anuak people in and around
Gambella, Ethiopia in December 2003.…Genocide Watch has checked these reports carefully with
eyewitnesses in Gambella as well as with the United States State Department and the United Nations, who
have confirmed that the massacres were committed by Ethiopian government forces.”).
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Gambella, Ethiopia.71 According to Genocide Watch, “Additional reports indicate that
the federal government of Ethiopia may have dispatched intelligence operatives to
neighboring countries to assassinate exiled Anuak leaders….the massacres on 13-16
December 2003 were ordered by the commander of the Ethiopian army in Gambella,
Nagu Beyene….” 72
As is typical with genocides, the people most likely to protect the intended
victims were first disarmed. Genocide Watch and Survivors’ Rights International
observed: “disarmament of Anuak police in Gambella…preceded the genocidal
massacres of December 13-16, 2003.”73
2. The African Union and its Forces
Another force currently available to the UN Security Council is the African
Standby Force, established by the African Union.74 A 1998 joint statement by African
heads of state and President Clinton promised a “concerted effort” to prevent the
resurgence of genocide in Africa.75
As of April 29, 2005, the African Standby Force in Darfur had grown to 2,200
troops and will, given sufficient foreign funding, eventually reach a total of more than

71

Gambella lies about 50 miles east of Sudan, and approximately 450 miles south of the border between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. As Michael Walzer wrote:
Nor would a UN army with its own officers, capable of acting independently in the field, always
find itself in the right field (that is, the killing fields). Its presence or absence would depend on
decisions of a Security Council likely to be as divided and uncertain as it is today, still subject to
great-power veto and severe budgetary constraints.

Michael Walzer, The Politics of Rescue, 62 SOCIAL RES. (1995).
See Survivor’s Rights International & Genocide Watch Call for Immediate Steps to Stop Massacres in
Southwestern Ethiopia, Genocide Watch and Survivors’ Rights Int’l, Feb. 28, 2004,
http://www.genocidewatch.org/PressReleaseAnuak022804.htm.
73
Id.
74
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Protocol_peace
and security.pdf. According to the Protocol’s Article 13, African Standby Force, Composition:
72

1.

In order to enable the Peace and Security Council [sic] perform its responsibilities
with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant
to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be
established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents,
with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid
deployment at appropriate notice.

See also Peter Kagwanja, Darfur: An African Union Peace-Keeping Crucible?, presented at a conference
Convened by the Centre for International Political Studies, on: Keeping Peace in Tough Neighborhood:
The Challenges Confronting Peacekeepers in Africa, or at the South African Defence College, Pretoria,
Sept. 14, 2004, http://www.up.ac.za/academic/cips/Publications/KTP_Dr_Peter_Kagwanja_ICG.pdf. (“The
ASF is conceived along the lines of the UN ‘standby arrangement’ where a state identifies, trains and
equips specific contingents for peace-keeping operations until the time comes for deployment.”).
75
SCHABAS, supra note 42, at 496-97, citing Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity, Joint Declaration
of Principles, www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/entebbe_dop_9803.html (Dec. 18, 1998).
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7,700 troops.76 The Sudanese government has slowed the entry of A.U. forces into Sudan,
by changing its passport policy so that A.U. soldiers were suddenly required to obtain
home-country passports and Sudanese visas.77
The UN Security Council supports the African Union activities in Darfur, and
urges member states to donate the required resources.78 However, the mandate for the
African Standby Force is only to protect international aid workers, not to protect the
people of Darfur.79 As Human Rights Watch accurately predicted, “Without such a
mandate, the A.U. force could be put in the position of watching helplessly while
civilians are slaughtered.” 80
By protecting aid workers, the A.U. forces are making an important contribution,
because they facilitate the delivery of food aid to the refugee camps where over a million
Darfurese have fled. Without the food aid, the genocide would be even worse;
historically, starvation has been a major tool of genocidal tyrants, such as Stalin against
the Ukranian people, Mao Zedong against the Chinese people, and Pol Pot against the
Cambodian people.
But the A.U. forces generally do not try to stop the mass murders and mass rapes
which the proxies of the Sudanese government (the Arab Janjaweed militias) perpetrate
against the Darfurese. At least sometimes, though, some A.U. soldiers go beyond their
formal mandate, and help protect civilians. At the Abu Shouk camp for internally
displaced persons, African Union soldiers have escorted women in their search for
firewood once a week outside the camp, where they were at high risk of rape. 81
Unfortunately, the ad hoc protection of civilians appears to contradict the African
Union’s own mission statement for Sudan. That document states: “Protection of the
76

David Loyn, Nato’s Role in Darfur, BBC NEWS, Apr. 29, 2005. See also African Union Says Force in
Darfur Reaches 1,400, Reuters, Feb. 4, 2005 (“The African Union force in Darfur is ultimately supposed
[sic] have 3,320 troops, but it has grown slowly because the pan-African body is relying on foreign aid to
pay for it.”).
77
South Africa Troop Deployment in Sudan’s Darfur Delayed, SUDAN TRIB., Feb. 28, 2005,
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=8278 (Col. Johan van der Walt complained: “the
deployment was delayed because the troops did not have passports and visas, as now required by the
Sudanese government.”). The Sudan Tribune is a dissident newspaper based in France.
78
S.C. Res. 1574, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5082nd meeting on 19 November 2004, at ¶13:
Strongly supports the decisions of the African Union to increase its mission in Darfur to
3,320 personnel and to enhance its mandate to include the tasks listed in paragraph 6 of
the African Union Peace and Security Council’s Communiqué of 20 October 2004, urges
Member States to provide the required equipment, logistical, financial, material, and
other necessary resources, and urges the Government of Sudan and all rebel groups in
Darfur to cooperate fully with the African Union;
79

Mandate Unclear as AU Heads for Darfur, BUS. DAY (Johannesburg), Oct. 29, 2004 (“However, key
questions about the expanded operation remained unresolved. Most notably, while there have been calls for
the mission to extend its mandate from providing security for observers to protecting civilians it is not clear
if this will transpire. The AU is not calling upon peacekeepers to protect civilians under threat in their
‘immediate vicinity’.”)
80
The African Union and Darfur, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 2005),
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/5.htm.
81
See Sudan: AU Protects Women from Attacks in North Darfur Camp, May 18, 2005, IRINNEWS.ORG,
http://www.irinnews.org/survey/Survey2005.asp (visited May 18, 2005).
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civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS.” [Government of Sudan].82 The
A.U.’s position, then is nearly identical to that of Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa
Ismali, who claims that “the security of Darfur is the responsibility of Sudan alone.”83
Ismali’s claim is functionally equivalent to a Nazi government statement that the security
of Jews in Germany is the responsibility only of the National Socialist Workers Party
government.
C. UN Forces in South Sudan
Darfur is not the only place in Sudan where government-supported forces have
been perpetrating crimes against humanity. Southern Sudan has long been troubled by
efforts of the Arab Muslim central government to impose Shari’a law, and wipe out the
black Christians and Animists of the south. The government used Arab militias as its
main offensive force. These militias enriched themselves by destroying African villages,
and then capturing the inhabitants, who were sold into slavery.84 Sudan is the only
country in the world where chattel slavery still exists with government approval.85
In late 2004, the armed resistance movements in southern Sudan finally forced the
government to agree to a cease-fire. The U.S. government also applied substantial
diplomatic pressure in favor of the cease-fire.
On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council voted to deploy 10,000 UN troops
to monitor the recent peace in the south of Sudan.86 The UN troops in the south will be
monitoring a peace agreement—not protecting civilians.
82

Working Document on the Enhancement of the African Mission in the Sudan, 1st Meeting of the military
Staff Committee of the Peace and Security and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 October 2004,
PSC/MSC/2(I), at 3.
83
Sudan Rejects AU Peace Force, BBC NEWS, Aug. 9, 2004.
84
JOK MADUT JOK, WAR AND SLAVERY IN THE SUDAN (2001).
85
International Eminent Persons Group, Slavery, Abduction, and Forced Servitude in Sudan (U.S. State
Dept., Bureau of African Affairs: May 22, 2002), http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/10445.htm.
British colonialists, such as Governor Charles Gordon, tried very hard to wipe out the slave trade, but were
not successful.
86
S/Res/1590, U.N. SCOR, Mar. 24, 2005. See generally Introduction of the Secretary General’s Report on
the Sudan by Jan Pronk to the Security Council, UN NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/infocusnewssudan.asp?sID=23. Pronk continued:
The core of this consists of 750 military observers. They will have to carry out a difficult
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However, Ann-Louise Colgan, of the Washington-based Africa Action, hopefully
noted: “Some commentators have suggested that the deployment of a 10,000-strong
peacekeeping force to southern Sudan might ultimately provide ‘peacekeeping by stealth’
for Darfur, noting that once these troops are in place in Sudan, it may later be possible to
re-deploy them to meet the urgent needs in Darfur.”87
It seems doubtful, though, that deploying ten thousand UN troops from southern
Sudan to Darfur would stop the Darfur genocide. Moving forces inside Sudan without the
consent of its dictatorship would violate Sudan’s sovereignty, and the UN has almost
never authorized such actions.88
The Sudan can field an army of 115,000 troops;89 and with the recent peace in the
south, 91,000 troops have now become available for redeployment to Darfur.90
Successful ground intervention in Darfur would almost certainly require vastly more than
the 10,000 UN troops slated for southern Sudan.91 An army of peacemakers (not just
peacekeepers)92 would need to be much larger,93 better-trained, and better-supplied than
any UN army ever has been.94
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As long as Khartoum is intent using genocide to “stabilize” Darfur, only a force
willing to engage in combat can save the unarmed victims. The UN will not, in the
foreseeable future, be able to field such a force,95 or cause such a force to be unleashed.
D. A No-Fly Zone
Although the use of ground forces to stop the Darfur genocide would be very
difficult, there is a relatively easy step which could substantially reduce the Sudanese
government’s military advantage over the genocide victims in Darfur:
If the UN and EU really are outraged by the Sudanese air attacks,
they could declare a “no fly zone” in Darfur region. The no-fly zone in
Darfur would operate like the no-fly zones the US and Britain enforced
over northern and southern Iraq after 1991. A dozen French and German
fighter aircraft based in Chad could protect the defenseless Darfurian
villages from air attack. Is this a likely scenario? Of course it isn’t—at the
moment the political will does not exist in the UN and EU to take such a
decisive military action. Imposing a no-fly zone, however, would save
lives.96
E. Conclusion on Internationally-authorized Force
Kofi Annan admitted “Quite frankly, our approach is not working,” and suggested
that the UN ought to step up pressure on the Sudanese government.97 Samantha Power
correctly recognized that force, not sanctions, would be the most effective answer to the
Darfur victims’ plight, noting that “The only hope for peace is an international protection
force….Yet amid all the talk of oil embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes, no
statesman…has attempted to rally the money, troops and political cooperation needed for
such a force.” Power recognized the futility of sanctions and the positive aspect of force.
Yet, she stopped short of naming the obvious practical immediate solution:
acknowledging the efficacy of self-protection by the victims themselves.98
At the 2004 Stockholm International Forum on genocide, Gareth Evans
summarized the consensus principles for military intervention: There must be large-scale
loss of life, and the motive for the intervention should be to save lives. Outside extra-
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national force should be used as a last resort, and only with the authorization of the
Security Council.99
The Stockholm Forum participants acknowledged a problem: “the UN Security
Council’s record of paralysis in humanitarian crises.”100 Evans suggested:
C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for
authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of
human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate
verification of facts, or conditions on the ground that might support a
military intervention. D. The Permanent Five members of the Security
Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their
vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions
authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which
there is otherwise majority support. 101
It would be wonderful if the Security Council acted as Evans says it “should,” but
the genocide victims in Sudan must live in a world based on what the Security Council
actually does—which in regard to the Sudanese genocide, is far too little. Indeed, if the
Security Council actually acted as it “should” according to the hopes of the UN’s
founders, then war would have long disappeared from the world.

III. Fatal Flaw: The UN Security Council versus Unilateralism
Although the Security Council has never stopped a genocide, various nations—
acting on their own and in violation of international law—have stopped genocides;
however, the end of the genocide was usually a by-product of an invasion undertaken for
other reasons.
For example, the Nazi genocide of Jews and Gypsies, and the Japanese genocide
in China, were ended when Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were conquered by the
Allies. At least some of the Allied actions violated international law. In 1942, U.S. forces
invaded the territory of a neutral nation—the northwest African colonies belonging to
Vichy France.102
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Idi Amin’s genocide in Uganda ended in 1979 when neighboring Tanzania
invaded Uganda and deposed Amin. Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia ended when the
communist dictatorship in Vietnam invaded Cambodia and drove him into exile in 197879.103 The genocide perpetrated by the government of East Pakistan (now, “Pakistan”)
against the people of West Pakistan (now, “Bangladesh”) was ended by Indian military
intervention in 1971.104
Even if India, Tanzania and Vietnam had acted for purely altruistic, humanitarian
motives, their actions to end the Bangaleshi, Ugandan, and Cambodian genocides would
have been illegal, according to the United Nations. As Michael Byers and Simon
Chesterman wrote, “any decision to engage in a humanitarian intervention was to be
made by the [Security] council alone….”105 They explained: “The ordinary meaning of
Article 2(4) [of the UN Charter] is clear: the use of force across borders is simply not
permitted. This meaning is supported by the UN Charter’s context, object and purpose—a
global effort to prohibit unilateral determinations of the just war by vesting sole authority
for the non-defensive use of force in the Security Council.”106
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed concern about the violation of
international law, even for a clearly morally justifiable purpose: “Is there not a danger of
such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after
the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions
without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what
circumstances?”107 Yet when referring to Rwanda, he also asked: “If, in those dark days
103
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and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in
defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should
such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?”108
Nicholas Wheeler argues that if the Security Council does not respond promptly,
and a state or coalition of states illegally intervened, the intervention would be “morally
justified” in instances where the humanitarian need was great.109 Another set of principles
for humanitarian intervention has been developed by Peter Baehr, in an address to the
International Peace Academy.110 In other words, there is higher moral law which overrules man-made international law (and the man-made construct of the sovereign state) in
dire circumstances.
The arguments made by Wheeler and Baehr have an eminently respectable
intellectual pedigree. Among the intellectual ancestors of Wheeler and Baehr, in
supporting humanitarian intervention, is Thomas Aquinas, who explicated principles of
Just War in his multi-volume Summa Theologica, which served as the foundation of
Catholic intellectual thought for most of the second millennium.111 Aquinas’s affirmative
duty to “rescue” and “deliver” appear to authorize Just War for humanitarian purposes,
not merely for reasons of national self-defense.112
Aquinas was the pre-eminent founder of the philosophical method of
Scholasticism, in the thirteenth century. Several centuries later, the “Second Scholastics”
flourished at the University of Salamanca, in Spain. Among them was Francisco de
Vitoria, a leading political philosopher of the late sixteenth century. At the time when
Spain was encountering the Indians of the New World, Vitoria argued that the Spanish
had no right to enslave or take the property of Indians in the New World. That the Indians
were pagans did not deprive them of their natural rights. At the same time, Vitoria wrote,
the Spanish had a right, indeed a moral duty, to intervene to protect the Indians who
would otherwise become victims of cannibalism or human sacrifice.113
The Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius, one of the major founders of modern
international law, argued in favor of foreign intervention to “stop the maltreatment by a
108
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state of its own nationals when that conduct is so brutal and large-scale as to shock the
conscience of the community of nations.”114
Even modern nations who profess the highest regard for United Nations
procedures sometimes violate international law and, in doing so, save innocent lives. On
November 4, 2004, Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo broke an 18-month truce
between his government and the rebels, the Forces Nouvelles, by attacking the rebel
stronghold in the northern town of Bouake.115 The attack killed several dozen civilians116
and nine French peacekeepers.
The African Union asked the UN Security Council to enlarge the AU’s mandate
in Sierra Leone, in order to protect civilians117 caught between the two warring factions.
While the Security Council discussed the situation, French President Jacques Chirac took
immediate action: he ordered French troops to destroy the Ivorian air force, and thereby
make it more difficult for Gbagbo to pursue his violent agenda.118 A cynic might describe
Chirac’s response as involving only punishment for French deaths. But were French
actions, in effect, an example of a developing international norm for unilateral
intervention to save civilians?119
Perhaps another example of the developing international norm came in March
1999, when President Clinton and some NATO allies claimed authority under the
Genocide Convention to bomb Serbia, even though the offensive action had never been
authorized by the United Nations.120
More unilateral military actions, especially by democratic nations, might save
many people from being killed by dictatorships. Yet according to Joel Rosenthal,
Carnegie Council president at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy of Tufts University,
“there is not a coherent and comprehensive legal framework in place to answer the
question of whether to intervene….we can find, without much trouble, a spectrum of
opinion ranging from staunch anti-interventionism to reluctant interventionism to dutybound interventionism.”121
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Kofi Annan observes “the developing international norm in favor of intervention
to protect innocent civilians from wholesale slaughter.”122 Unfortunately, the norm of
intervention to stop wholesale slaughter is extremely underdeveloped in practice. Neither
the Security Council, nor any other multilateral body, nor any nation(s) acting unilaterally
have stopped the genocide in Sudan. Nor are they stopping the genocide by governmentcaused starvation in Zimbabwe. Nor did they stop the genocides in the Soviet Union,
Communist China, Guatemala, or Rwanda. Even when a genocidal government (such as
Hitler’s Germany, Amin’s Uganda, or Pol Pot’s Cambodia) made the error of provoking
a stronger nation and prompting an invasion, that invasion eventually stopped the
genocide, but did not prevent the genocide from being initiated.
A policy that relies on the Security Council to prevent genocides has historically
been proven to be ineffective. A policy that relies on unilateral invasions to prevent
genocide may save lives, but such a policy has, historically, resulted in action that, at
best, came far too late to save millions of genocide victims. Moreover, humanitarian,
non-defensive unilateral intervention is, by the dominant interpretation of international
law, illegal.
We face an unacceptable contradiction:
1. As we will detail in Part V, infra, the Genocide Convention and natural moral
law are both clear that genocide is a violation of international law, and that no
person has a legal duty to be subjected to genocide. Because there is no right
without a remedy, there must, necessarily by international law, be a remedy
for genocide victims.
2. All remedies dependent on international state action are failures.
Comprehensive sanctions, “smart” sanctions, international peace-keeping
forces, and UN Security Council mandates are ineffective in preventing
genocide. Unilateral action by a single state or by several states, does save
some victims—towards the end of the genocide process—but has not
protected the early genocide victims in any state, or any of the genocide
victims in most states where genocide has been perpetrated.
Accordingly, there must necessarily, by international law, be some other remedy
to prevent genocide. In the remainder of this Article, we propose a particular remedy
which we argue is mandated by international law. If some readers dislike this remedy, we
remind them of the international law obligation created by statements 1. and 2. above. If
someone proposes a better remedy—which in practice actually saves more genocide
victims than does our remedy—we accede. But the terrible genocides of the last century
suggest that there is no remedy better than the one we will detail.
intervention, writes: “a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights, that
is, rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone....Sovereignty serves valuable human ends,
and those who grossly assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty
principle….” Fernando R. Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 105.
122
Koki Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, address to the 54th session of the U.N. General Assembly,
Sept. 20, 1999, reprinted in THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
44 (U.N. 1999), quoted in Tharoor & Daws, at 29.

25

IV. Defenseless Victims
Sudan is ruled by a racist, Islamist tyranny in Khartoum.
For many years, the Arab Sudanese dictatorship pursued a policy of genocide
against the Christian and animist black Africans who live in southern Sudan. Victims
who were not killed were often sold in slavery. Rape was extensively used as an
instrument of state terror. Thanks to the continuing success of armed resistance by the
south Sudanese, the Khartoum government finally accepted a cease-fire in late 2004. The
government has promised that in 2010, the south Sudanese will be able to vote on a
referendum for independence.
The vast Darfur region consists of three states in western Sudan.123 As in the
south, much of the population is black African. Unlike in the south, the black Africans of
Darfur are Muslims.124 Also inhabiting Darfur are camel-riding Arab nomads, who have a
long-standing conflict with black African pastoralists there. The Arabs consider the
blacks to be racially inferior, and fit only for slavery. “Beginning in the mid-1980s,
successive governments in Khartoum inflamed matters by supporting and arming the
Arab tribes, in part to prevent the southern rebels from gaining a foothold in the
region….Arabs formed militias, burned African villages, and killed thousands. Africans
in turn formed self-defense groups, members of which eventually became the first Darfur
insurgents to appear in 2003.”125
Two movements seeking independence for Darfur were created in February 2003:
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In
April 2003, the rebels successfully attacked a government airfield, provoking massive
retaliation by the Khartoum government.126
On the ground, the main force of the government’s attack on the black Africans of
Darfur is Arab militia known as the Janjaweed (literally, “evil men on horseback” or
“devil on a horse”).127
The Janjaweed have caused the deaths of up to 400,000 black Sudanese, have
raped many thousands, and have forced two million black Sudanese into refugee
123

The states (wilayat) are Gharb Darfur, Janub Darfur, and Shamal Darfur.
Scott Straus, What’s in a Name? 84 FOR. AFF. 123 (Jan.-Feb. 2005).
125
Straus; Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 76, Mar. 25,
2004, http://www.crisisweb.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=1132&tid=2550, at 18-19.
124

The SLA drew its first recruits from Fur self-defence militias that had arisen during the
1987-1989 conflict. The emergence in 2001 of a group of largely Fur and Massaleit
fighters in southern and western Darfur coincided with the decision of Zaghawa young
men to rebel against the government. The Zaghawa insurgents were unhappy about the
government's failure to enforce the terms of a tribal peace agreement requiring nomads of
Arab background to pay blood money for killing dozens of Zaghawas, including
prominent tribal chiefs. The SLA grew out of this increased cooperation between the Fur,
Massaleit and Zaghawa groups.
Id., at 19 (footnote marker deleted).
126
Targeting the Fur: Mass Killings in Darfur, A Human Rights Watch Paper, Jan. 21, 2005,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.pdf, at 6.
127
Straus.

26

camps.128 “When the janjaweed attack, they unmistakably hurl racial abuse at their
victims, alleging in particular that Africans are born to be slaves: ‘Slaves, run! Leave the
country. You don’t belong; why are you not leaving this area for Arab cattle to
graze?’”129
The Janjaweed attacks on villages are supported with aerial bombing by the
Sudan Air Force.130 There are no reports of response to these attacks from villagers or
from the JEM or SLA. The rebel groups do not appear to have anti-aircraft weapons, such
as surface-to-air missiles. The rebels do possess small arms and light weapons, including
firearms.131
Salah Gosh, head of Sudan’s national security, admitted that the government is,
indeed, bombing the villages, noting: “The [rebel] militia are attacking the government
from the villages. What is the government going to do? It will bomb those villages.”132
Notably, the majority of villages bombed were villages where there were no armed
rebels.133 Thus, the destruction of the villages should be seen not as an overzealous form
of counter-insurgency warfare, but rather as a deliberate attempt to destroy an entire
society.
Although this is commonplace where the population supports an anti-government
insurgency, it can also lead to deaths of innocent civilians on a large scale.134
Intentionally targeting civilians has long been recognized as a violation of the laws of
warfare. An Amnesty International report noted “international law also makes it clear that
use of such tactics does not provide the other side with a license to kill civilians.”135
The Sudanese government tells the international community that the central
government is not responsible for the Arab versus African violence in Darfur. However,
Human Rights Watch observed that “Government forces not only participated and
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supported militia attacks on civilians, they also actively refused to provide security to
civilians seeking protection from these militia attacks.”136
Despite promises from the Sudanese government, the attacks on Darfur grew even
worse in early 2005. The U.S. Department of State reported that brutal attacks were still
occurring, and that “attacks on civilians, rape, kidnapping and banditry actually increased
in April.”137 According to the Sudan Tribune, “Attention to Darfur’s staggering death
toll—which has grown to approximately 400,000 over the course of more than two years
of genocidal conflict—has increased in the past several months.” UN Undersecretary for
Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland warns that the death rate might increase to 100,000
per month.138
Egeland notes: “The only thing in abundance in Darfur is weapons.”139 However,
these weapons are distributed unevenly among Darfur’s population. Despite the UN arms
embargo,140 Sudan has been funding its arms buildup using income from its oil sector to
supply the Arab militia friendly to Khartoum.141 According to Amnesty International, the
Janjaweed are so well-supplied that the majority of them have five or six guns per
person.142
But in Sudan, it is virtually impossible for an average citizen to lawfully acquire
and possess the means for self-defense. According to the national gun-control statutes,143
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a gun licensee must be over 30 years of age, must have a specified social and economic
status, and must be examined physically by a doctor. Females have even more difficulty
meeting these requirements because of social and occupational limitations.
When these restrictions are finally overcome, there are additional restrictions on
the amount of ammunition one may possess, making it nearly impossible for a lawabiding gun owner to achieve proficiency with firearms. A handgun owner, for example,
can only purchase 15 rounds of ammunition a year. The penalties for violation of Sudan's
firearms laws are severe, and can include capital punishment.
International gun-control groups complain that Sudan's gun laws are not strict
enough—but the real problem with the laws is that they have been—and are—enforced
arbitrarily. A U.S. Department of State document stated: “After President Bashir seized
power in 1989, the new government disarmed non-Arab ethnic groups but allowed
politically loyal Arab allies to keep their weapons.”144 Meanwhile, there are many reports
that the Arab militia have been armed and supplied by the government in Khartoum.145
After a village has been softened up by government air bombardment, the
Janjaweed enter and pillage, killing and raping in order to displace the population and
steal the land.146 The victim villagers are generally unarmed.147 Amnesty International
reported the testimony of a villager who complained: “none of us had arms and we were
not able to resist the attack.”148 One under-armed villager lamented: “I tried to take my
spear to protect my family, but they threatened me with a gun, so I stopped. The six
Arabs then raped my daughter in front of me, my wife and my other children.”149
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In cases when the villagers were able to resist, the cost to the marauders rose:
Human Rights Watch reported that “some of Kudun’s residents mobilized to protect
themselves, and fifteen of the attackers were reportedly killed.”150
The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review asked a U.S. State Department official why there
were no reports of the Darfur victims fighting back. “Some do defend themselves,” he
explained. But he added that the perpetrators have helicopters and automatic rifles,
whereas the victims have only machetes.151
The Tribune Review asked an Amnesty International representative, Trish
Katyoka, whether the Darfur victims should be armed.152 Her response is worth analyzing
sentence by sentence.
She began: “We at Amnesty International are not going to condone escalation of
the flow of arms to the region.”153 The answer is not surprising. In the last decade,
Amnesty International has become a leading worldwide advocate for total gun
prohibition—a stance seemingly at odds with its declared policy of opposing government
abuses of human rights.154
“You are empowering (the victims) to create an element of retaliation.”155 The
answer shows a serious confusion about self-defense. “Retaliation” is taking revenge for
a misdeed after the fact. Self-defense is prevention of an imminent, unlawful, violent
attack. Protecting a girl from an imminent gang rape has nothing to do with “retaliation.”
“Whenever you create a sword-fight by letting the poor people fight back and
give them arms, it creates an added element of complexity. You do not know what the
results will be.”156 Ms. Katyoka’s statement was entirely accurate. A situation in which
the victim and the attacker both have arms is much more complex than a situation in
which the attacker is armed and the victim is helpless. In the latter, uncomplex situation,
the result is easy to predict. In Sudan, it is easy to predict continued genocide—well in
excess of 10,000 murders a month157—or over 300 per day. And innumerable mass rapes.
When the attacker faces a risk of being killed by his intended victim, the attacker
faces a much more complicated situation. He must balance his potential pleasure of
murder and rape against his potential risk of death or injury. Sometimes, the attacker may
decide that even a fairly small risk of death outweighs the momentary pleasures of
murder and rape.
She summarized: “Fighting fire with fire is not the solution to genocide. It is a
dangerous proposition to arm the minorities to fight back.”158 Generic platitudes should
rarely be dispositive when considering a life or death question. Besides, “fighting fire
150
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with fire” is an excellent strategy. When a large outdoor area is burning, fire-fighters
create a firebreak. They do so by burning a strip of land that lies in the path of the
advancing wildfire. When the wildfire reaches the burnt firebreak, there is no fire left for
the wildfire to burn, so the wildfire cannot advance, and eventually burns itself out,
unable to advance beyond the firebreak.
Similarly, it is common to fight firearms with firearms. That is why almost all
governments issue firearms to police officers, so they may fight criminals who have
firearms.
To allow minorities to fight back against the perpetrators of genocide is
undoubtedly “dangerous” to the perpetrators. But nothing can be more dangerous to the
victims than a continuing genocide. Accordingly, giving the victims firearms cannot
possibly make the situation more dangerous for the victims; by making the situation more
dangerous for the perpetrators, there is at least the possibility that some victims might be
saved. Because genocide perpetrators have no moral or legal right to non-dangerous
working conditions, the balance of equities favors arming of victims.
Amnesty International’s proposed alternatives to arming the victims are two-fold:
First, the organization hopes that the United Nations does something.159 Given that the
United Nations has never ever stopped any of the many genocides that have taken place
during the organization’s six-decade history, telling the genocide victims to wait
passively until the U.N. rescues them is shockingly foolish and callous. The victims
would be better off praying for a meteor to strike Khartoum—since human history does at
least record occasional instances of large meteor strikes, whereas the historical record is
bereft of any instance of meaningful U.N. action against genocide in progress.
Amnesty International’s other hope is for the prosecution of Sudanese leadership
in the International Criminal Court.160 On March 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
referred the Sudanese situation to the prosecutors of the International Criminal Court.161
The Genocide Convention requires signatory states to “punish” genocide. It is possible
that prosecution of genocide perpetrators from Nazi Germany, Serbia, and Rwanda may
have deterred some other genocides. Prosecution of the Sudanese genocide perpetrators
would also be a good thing. But the hope of prosecution at some time in the future is not
saving the victims who are being killed right now. Post-hoc prosecution of a murderer is
not an adequate substitute for attempting to save the victim’s life before the murder is
accomplished. The threat of prosecution by the International Criminal Court has
apparently not dissuaded the Sudanese government from its current policy of genocide.
The historical record shows that, almost without exception, genocide is preceded
by a very careful government program that disarms the future victims. Genocide is almost
never attempted against an armed population. Armenia, Rwanda, Bosnia, China,
Guatemala, Cambodia, Uganda, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Europe are among the places
where genocidal tyrants made very sure that the victim populations were disarmed; only
after disarmament did genocide begin.162
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Conversely, when genocide victims can obtain arms, the genocidal government’s
work becomes much more difficult. For example, the Nazis had to spend more time
subduing the Warsaw Ghetto than they did conquering the entire nations of Poland or
France.163 As holocaust historian Abram L. Sachar wrote:
The indispensable need, of course, was arms. As soon as some Jews, even in the
camps themselves, obtained possession of a weapon, however pathetically
inadequate—a rifle, an ax, a sewer cover, a homemade bomb—they used it and
often took Nazis with them to death.164
In 1967, the International Society for the Prevention of Crime held a Congress in
Paris on the prevention of genocide. The Congress concluded that
defensive measures are the most effective means for the prevention of genocide.
Not all aggression is criminal. A defense reaction is for the human race what the
wind is for navigation—the result depends on the direction. The most moral
violence is that used in legitimate self-defense, the most sacred judicial
institution.165
If the Darfurese in the refugee camps possessed simple firearms, the refugees
would hardly be able to march on Khartoum and overthrow the government. But the
refugees would be able to drive off the Janjaweed who come to a camp for plunder,
murder, and rape. Similarly, the refugees would be able to leave the camp in order to
search for firewood. If every Darfurese family were armed, perhaps some groups of
families would be able to return to the villages and farms from which they were recently
driven by Khartoum’s ethnic cleansing.

V. The Right of Genocide Victims to Possess Defensive Arms
A. The Genocide Convention
The Sudanese government has not, in general, attempted to interfere with the
sovereignty of other nations. Thus, in a world in which “sovereignty” reigns supreme in
international law, the Sudanese dictatorship claims that it should be left alone to do as it
wishes to the people of Darfur.166
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However, the present Sudanese government has voluntarily surrendered a p
ortion of its sovereignty. On October 13, 2003, Sudan ratified The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 167 The Convention became legally
binding on the Sudanese government on January 11, 2004.168
The Convention states: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and punish.”169 Neither the text of the Genocide Convention
nor the drafting history provide guidance about the scope of the legal obligation to
prevent genocide.170 However, international law is clear that the duty to prevent is real,
and is entirely distinct from the duty to punish.171
The Genocide Convention prohibits more than the direct killing of humans. Other
actions—if undertaken with genocidal intent—can constitute genocide. For example, rape
would not normally be genocide, but if a political or military commander promoted the
widespread rape of a civilian population—with the intent of preventing normal
reproduction by that population—then the pattern of rape could constitute genocide.172
Similarly, many governments do not provide their citizens with minimal food
rations or medical care. Such omissions are not genocide. On the other hand, if a
government eliminated food rations to a particular group but not to other groups, and the
change in rations policy was undertaken with the intent of exterminating the particular
group by starvation, then the government’s termination of food aid could constitute
genocide.173
Similarly, under normal conditions, governments have extensive authority over
arms possession within their borders. But to the extent that a government enacted or
applied arms control laws for the purpose of facilitating genocide, then the government’s
actions would constitute genocide.174
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B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other Human Rights
Instruments
Another international law source of the right to resist genocide is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948.
The Universal Declaration never explicitly mentions “genocide”, but a right to
resist genocide is an inescapable implication of the rights which the Declaration does
affirm.
First, the Declaration affirms the right to life.175 Of course the right to life is
recognized not just by the Universal Declaration, but also by several other international
human rights instruments.176
Second, the Declaration affirms the right to personal security.177 The right of selfdefense is implicit in the right of personal security, and is explicitly recognized by, inter
alia, the European Convention on Human Rights178 and by the International Criminal
Court.179
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes a right of
rebellion as a last resort: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law....”180 The travaux (drafting history) of the
Universal Declaration clearly show that the Preamble was explicitly intended to
recognize a pre-existing human right to revolution against tyranny.181
Finally, Article 8 of the Universal Declarations states that “Everyone has the right
to an effective remedy.”182 The Universal Declaration therefore comports with the longestablished common law rule that there can be no right without a remedy.183
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Thus, the Declaration recognizes that when a government destroys human rights
and all other remedies have failed, the people are “compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.” Because “Everyone has the right to
an effective remedy,” the people necessarily have the right to possess and use arms to
resist tyranny, if arms use is the only remaining “effective remedy.” 184
In international law, a “Declaration” does not directly have a binding legal effect,
although it may be used as evidence of customary international law. For example, the
Statute of the International Court of Justice gives the court authority to apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.185
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would not be applied under
subsection “a”, because the Declaration does not, by its own terms, create legallyenforceable international law. However, a court could apply some or all of the Universal
Declaration pursuant to subsections “b” or “c”—“international custom” or “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”
The Anglo-American legal tradition supports the right to armed resistance among
the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” For example, the United
States Supreme Court noted that the right to arms, like the right to peaceably assemble, is
not created by positive law, but rather derives “‘from those laws whose authority is
183
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acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.’ It is found wherever civilization
exists.”186
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the common law are by far the most
influential legal treatise ever published. Published in 1765, Blackstone’s treatise was
regarded as the foundation of the common law throughout the English-speaking world,
and in the one-third of the globe where British law ruled. The Commentaries are part of
the common-law heritage of any present or former British colony or member of the
Commonwealth of Nations.
In the explanation of human rights under the common law, Blackstone first
described the three primary rights: personal security, personal liberty, and private
property. He then explained the five “auxiliary rights” which protected the primary
rights:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their condition
and degree, and such as are allowed by law ... and it is indeed a public
allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient
to restrain the violence of oppression.187
C. Jus Cogens
Under international law, some laws are accorded the status of jus cogens, which
means that in case of conflict, they override other laws.188 Many commentators agree that
the duty to prevent genocide must be considered jus cogens.189 Indeed, it would be
difficult to articulate a more fundamental principle than the prevention of genocide.
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It bears noting that the father of the principle which was eventually named jus
cogens was Franciso Suárez, a scholar and Jesuit who is recognized as a founder of
modern international law.190 Suárez’s views are, therefore, highly significant regarding
which human rights should be considered so fundamental as to be jus cogens.
The record is clear that Suárez strongly believed in a natural human right of selfdefense.191 Self-defense, said Suárez, was “the greatest of rights,” a right which belonged
to individuals and to communities. This right of self-defense included a right of defense
against tyrants.192 According to the great British historian Lord Acton, “the greater part of
the political ideas” of John Milton and John Locke “may be found in the ponderous Latin
of Jesuits who were subjects of the Spanish Crown,” including Suárez.193
Thus, it seems apparent that the prevention of genocide is jus cogens norm.
Moreover, the roots of the jus cogens principle necessarily implicate a natural right of
self-defense against genocide.
Accordingly, the legal duty to prevent genocide would be superior to whatever
limits the United Nations Charter sets on military action which is not authorized by the
law that have attained the status of jus cogens norms include the prohibitions on genocide and
slavery.”
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Security Council. Similarly, the legal duty to prevent genocide would be superior to
treaties or conventions restricting the transfer or possession of arms.
D. Application of the Genocide Convention against Arms Control: The Case of
Bosnia
Since the Genocide Convention came into force half a century ago, there has been
very little exposition of the meaning of the Convention’s affirmative duty on signatory
states “to prevent” genocide. Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, very little has actually
been done to stop on-going genocides in the last half century.
The first legal analysis of the prevention duty came from the dissenting judges in
a 1951 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, in which the Court made a
non-binding ruling on whether the “reservations” which some states attached to their
ratification of the Genocide Convention were legally effective. The dissenting judges’
words have often been quoted by human rights activists: “the enormity of the crime of
genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any treaty for its repression deserves the most
generous interpretation.”194
The first, and so far only, contested case involving the scope of the duty to
prevent genocide was Bosnia v. Yugoslavia, in which an opinion by Judge Lauterpacht
squarely faced the duty to prevent issue.
Yugoslavia had been created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and until the
country broke up in 1991, it was the largest nation on the Balkan peninsula.
Yugoslavia was turned into a Communist dictatorship in 1945 by Marshal Tito. When
Tito died in 1980, his successors feared civil war, so a system was instituted according to
which the collective leadership of government and party offices would be rotated
annually. But the new government foundered, and in 1989, Serbian president Milosevic
began re-imposing Serb and Communist hegemony. Slovenia and Croatia declared
independence in June 1991.
Slovenia repelled the Yugoslav army in ten days, but fighting in Croatia
continued until December, with the Yugoslav government retaining control of about a
third of Croatia. Halfway through the Croat-Yugoslav war, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 713, calling for “a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia” (meaning rump Yugoslavia, plus Croatia
and Slovenia).195
It was universally understood that the Serbs were in control of most of the
Yugoslavian army's weaponry, and that the embargo therefore left them in a position of
military superiority. Conversely, even though the embargo was regularly breached, it left
non-Serbs vulnerable. The U.N. had, in effect, deprived the incipient countries of the
right to self-defense, a right guaranteed under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Macedonia seceded peacefully from Yugoslavia in early 1992, but BosniaHerzegovina's secession quickly led to a three-way civil war between Bosnian Muslims
(“Bosniacs”), Serbs (who are Orthodox), and Croats (who are Roman Catholic). The
Bosnian Serbs received substantial military support from what remained of old
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Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, and under the control of Slobodan
Milosevic).
Security Council Resolution 713 now operated to make it illegal for the new
Bosnian government to acquire arms to defend itself from Yugoslav aggression.
Bosnia sued Yugoslavia in the United Nations’ International Court of Justice.196
In April 1993, the International Court of Justice ruled, with only one dissenter, that
Yugoslavia was perpetrating genocide, and ordered it to stop. 197
A few months later, Bosnia brought forward additional legal claims. Among the
new claims was a request to have the UN embargo declared illegal, as a violation of the
Genocide Convention. The majority of the I.C.J. voted only to re-affirm portions of the
April 1993 Order; they stated that the court had no jurisdiction over the Security
Council’s embargo. The majority’s ruling was not implausible, since the Security Council
was not a party to the case.
Several judges who had voted in favor of the majority opinion also wrote separate
opinions. One of the judges, Judge Elihu Lauterpacht, wrote a separate opinion which
was the first international court opinion ever to address the legal scope of the Genocide
Convention’s affirmative duty “to prevent” genocide.
Judge Lautherpacht cited the findings of a Special Rapporteur about the effect of
the arms embargo, and pointed to the “direct link…between the continuation of the arms
embargo and the exposure of the Muslim population of Bosnia to genocidal activity at the
hands of the Serbs.”198
Normally, Security Council resolutions are unreviewable by the International
Court of Justice. However, Judge Lauterpacht ruled that the prevention of genocide is jus
cogens.199 He concluded that the Security Council arms embargo became void once it
made U.N. member-states “accessories to genocide.”200
Formal repeal of the Security Council embargo was impossible, because Russia
threatened to use its veto to prevent any action harmful to its client-state Serbia.
However, Judge Lauterpacht’s opinion stated that the UN embargo was already void as a
matter of law, the moment it came into conflict with the Genocide Convention.
Accordingly, Bosnia acted in accordance with international law when Bosnia subverted
the U.N. arms embargo, by importing arms from Arab countries. The U.S.A.’s Clinton
Administration, which winked at the Bosnian arms smuggling, was compliant with
international law, even though the administration was subverting a Security Council
resolution which purported to set a binding international rule.
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VI. International Law Implications
Decisions of the International Court of Justice are binding only on the parties to
the case. So even if Judge Lauterpacht had written the majority opinion, rather than a
concurring opinion, the opinion would not, ipso facto, create a binding international
standard of law. Nevertheless, Judge Lauterpacht’s opinion brings together several
principles which seem difficult to deny:
•
•
•
•
•

The Genocide Convention imposes an affirmative duty to prevent genocide.
The Genocide Convention is jus cogens. (If the Genocide Convention is not so
important so as to be jus cogens, than hardly anything else could be.)
Numerous international standards affirm a right of self-defense, including a right
to self-defense against criminal governments perpetrating genocide.
In some cases, a state’s compliance with an otherwise-valid arms control law may
bring the state into violation of Genocide Convention, if the arms control law
facilitates genocide.
Therefore, in the case of conflict between the arms control law and the Genocide
Convention, every state and the United Nations, including their courts, is
obligated to obey the Genocide Convention.

To see that the final principle is an inescapable standard of international law, one
only need state the converse, which is self-evidently immoral and abhorrent: “An
international or national court must always enforce arms prohibition laws, even if
enforcement makes the court complicit in genocide.”
The majority of the U.N. International Court of Justice was, understandably,
reluctant to confront the U.N. Security Council by declaring a Security Council resolution
to be unlawful. In this Article, though, we are not primarily concerned with whether the
I.C.J. will develop the institutional strength to confront illegal actions of the Security
Council. Rather, our focus is on the standard of conduct for all persons, including
domestic and international judges, who are concerned with obeying international human
rights law, especially the Genocide Convention.
Let us now examine some particular applications of the international human right
of genocide victim self-defense.
1. Sudanese Gun Controls
Sudan’s national gun control laws are invalid, insofar as they are enforced to
prevent the genocide victims of Darfur from obtaining firearms for lawful defense against
genocide. The anti-genocide rule does not affect the validity of Sudanese gun laws as
applied in areas of the country, such as northeast Sudan, where no genocide is taking
place.
The practical juridicial effect of our finding about the enforcement of Sudanese
gun laws in Darfur is limited. After all, Sudanese enforcement of national gun control
laws in Darfur tends to proceed mainly by killing people, not by putting them on trial.
Moreover, even if a Sudanese court did try a gun law prosecution, it would not be
realistic to expect the Sudanese court to rule, in effect, “Sudan’s gun laws, while prima
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facie valid, cannot presently be enforced against the people of Darfur who are trying to
defend themselves against the genocide sponsored by the Sudanese government.” A
regime which perpetrates genocide is unlikely to tolerate an independent judiciary which
would interfere with the genocide.
Acknowledgement that enforcement of the Sudanese gun laws against the people
of Darfur is a violation of the Genocide Convention could, perhaps, be of significance to
non-Sudanese government officials. For example, if a Sudanese national smuggled arms
to the Darfur victims, and then took refuge in another country, that country’s executive or
judicial officers might refuse to extradite the smuggler to Sudan. Notwithstanding an
extradition treaty with the Sudan, application of the extradition treaty, in the particular
case of the anti-genocide arms smuggler, would make the host country complicit in
genocide.
2. The Sudanese Arms Embargo
As we have detailed infra, the U.N. Security Council has imposed an arms
embargo which prohibits the transfer of arms to: the government of Sudan; the Janjaweed
Arab militias; and the resistance movement in Darfur (the SLA and the JEM).
The application of the embargo to the Darfur resistance is a violation of the
Genocide Convention, for the same reasons that Judge Lauterpacht stated that application
of the Security Council arms embargo to Bosnia was a violation of the Genocide
Convention: A facially neutral arms control which leaves genocide victims helpless
against genocide perpetrators is a violation of the Genocide Convention; enforcement of
such an embargo makes the enforcer complicit in genocide.
Accordingly, no state has a legal obligation to interfere with the delivery of arms
to the people of Darfur. To hinder their acquisition of arms would be to assist the
genocide being perpetrated in Darfur.
3. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms
In the Spring of 2005, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms became law, for the more than forty nations which have ratified
the Protocol. Briefly stated, the Protocol requires that parties to the Protocol enact laws
requiring that all firearms manufactured in the host country have a serial number and a
manufacturer identification. (The United States enacted a similar law decades ago.)
Further, ratifying countries must keep registration records of firearms sales and owners,
for the purpose of combating international arms smuggling. The Protocol exempts
Communist China from its requirements, even though China is a major international
source of illegal firearms.
For the same reason that Sudanese gun laws and the Security Council embargo
cannot be enforced against the victims in Darfur, neither can the Protocol. Thus, if a
defendant were charged in a national or international court with violating the Protocol, he
should be allowed to raise an affirmative defense showing that he was supplying arms to
genocide victims.
The affirmative defense would be consistent with the spirit of the Preamble to the
Protocol, which recognizes the inherent rights of self-defense and self-determination:
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Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which
implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to
defend themselves, as well as the right of self-determination of all peoples,
in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or
foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of that
right,
….
Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations,
4. Proposed Convention Prohibiting Transfer of Firearms to “Non-State Actors”
In 2001, the United Nations held a convention on “small arms” which many
people hoped would produce an international treaty restricting the possession and transfer
of firearms. No such treaty was produced, mainly because of adamant opposition from
the American delegation. A new convention, with similar objectives, is scheduled to take
place at the United Nations headquarters in July 2006.
Among the most sought objectives of the treaty advocates is an international
prohibition on the transfer of firearms to “non-state actors”—that is, to anyone not
approved by government.201 Should an international treaty be created, it should include
an explicit exemption to authorize supplying arms to genocide victims. Such an exception
must exist, implicitly, because of the jus cogens status of the Genocide Convention.
However, it would be clearer for the treaty to include an explicit exception. Indeed, any
nation’s delegation which refused to vote in favor of an exception for genocide victims
would necessarily raise doubts about its own commitment to human rights.
5. The Precautionary Principle: The Right of Potential Genocide Victims to Possess
Defensive Arms
In all of the above applications of the anti-genocide rules—to national laws, to
Security Council resolutions, and to international protocols or treaties—we have argued
that the self-defense rule of the Genocide Convention takes precedence over other laws
only when genocide is actually taking place. That is the status of the current international
law, as embodied in Judge Lauterpacht’s opinion in Bosnia v. Yugoslavia.
We have also confined ourselves to cases of genocide in progress, because they
are the easiest cases to see clearly. In this section, we explore the potential boundaries of
the right of self-defense against genocide. Our approach here is suggestive, not definitive.
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During World War II, although Jews resisted Hitler more so than any other group
behind Nazi lines, the majority of Jews did not engage in armed resistance. One huge
barrier to resistance was that the Jews were unarmed. Except in the Zionist self-defense
units, there was very little familiarity with firearms among most of Europe’s Jews. Prewar Poland, the home of the largest number of Jews who were murdered, was a poorly
armed nation. The anti-Semitic government was hostile to gun ownership by workers.202
Unlike all the other undergrounds in Europe, the Jewish partisans received no
weapons from the Allies.203 Holocaust scholar Nechama Tec summarizes: “As regards
resistance, in practical terms, the Allies had virtually no interest in the Jews. This
indifference translated into a rejection of all known Jewish pleas, including those
requesting arms and ammunition. It goes without saying that the Jews experienced a
chronic arms shortage.”204 (The U.S. and Britain did supply arms to the French
Resistance, which had a large number of Jews. The Americans and British also supplied
arms to the Soviet Union, which in turn supplied some arms to Soviet partisan units, and
some of the Soviet units included Jews.)
According to Emmanuel Ringlebaum’s history of the Warsaw Ghetto, “We state
firmly that had the responsible Polish authorities extended moral support and helped us
with arms, the Germans would have had to pay for the sea of Jewish blood shed in July,
August, and September 1942,” as Jews were deported to Treblinka.205
Holocaust historian Abram L. Sachar observed: “the difference between
resistance and submission depended very largely upon who was in possession of the arms
that back up the will to do or die.”206
If the Genocide Convention had been international law throughout the twentieth
century, then European Jews in Nazi-controlled areas would have had the international
legal right to possess defensive arms—once the Nazi genocide began. But, obviously,
Jewish resistance would have been much more successful if the Jews had been able to
acquire arms before genocide commenced. After all, a group which is targeted for
imminent genocide is usually under extreme totalitarian control, prohibited from
acquiring arms, and with almost no ability to obtain firearms from benevolent third
parties.
Similarly, Alan J. Kuperman pointed out that “In the case of Rwanda, however,
even a policy of reacting immediately to evidence of genocide would have been
insufficient to save most of the victims. To be more successful, a lower threshold for
action would have been required, perhaps authorizing intervention as soon as the risk of
genocide was deemed sufficiently high.”207
So would it be reasonable to extend the right of self-defense against genocide to
include a right of at-risk groups to acquire arms before a genocide actually begins? As the
historical record of genocide shows, if the victim population is armed, the armament is
likely to deter the initiation of genocide. Is it possible to create a precautionary principle
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which deters genocide? Can the precautionary principle be narrowly construed, so that it
does not make gun control legally impossible?
The easiest case for a precautionary extension of the self-defense rule would be to
groups in countries where: 1. Genocide has taken place in the recent past against the
group; and 2. Genocide is currently taking place against a different group. The second
part of this two-part test shows that the national government still uses genocide as an
instrument of state policy. The first part of the two-part test shows that the group faces a
notably large risk. Therefore, the two-part test would suggest that defensive firearms
should not be denied to the African Christians and Animists of southern Sudan. Over a
million of them were killed by Sudanese genocide, and the Sudanese government still
practices genocides, in west Sudan, against the people of Darfur.
Similar arguments could be made for the defensive rights of at-risk groups in
other nations whose current regime has recently perpetrated genocide.
The human rights organization Genocide Watch has created a model of the eight
stages of genocide: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization,
polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial.208 Most of this Article has focused
on cases where the genocide has advanced to the extermination stage. At the least, the
precautionary principle should authorize arms acquisition by victims when a genocidal
government has advanced to the stage of “preparation.”
Of course there may be good-faith uncertainty about whether a particular
government really has entered the preparation stage. After all, governments intent on
genocide almost never make candid announcements about their intentions. And
sometimes third parties will, for reasons, of their own, remain willfully blind to genocidal
preparations; for example, in early 1994, the United Nations peacekeeping mission was
warned well in advance by a “well-placed informer” that the Rwandan government was
planning a genocide Yet the United Nations did nothing.209
However, once a morally accountable person—such as a head of state, a diplomat,
a judge, or any other person—makes a good-faith determination that a particular
government has entered the preparation stage of genocide, then the moral person should
immediately refrain from any action (including the enforcement of ordinarily-applicable
gun control laws) which might interfere with the ability of the targeted genocide victims
to arm themselves defensively.
Unfortunately, at the present time, despite intense examination of risk factors
associated with various social conflict situations,210 the predictability of genocidal
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activity remains poor.211 Although, at some point, we may learn to anticipate conflict,
according to Barbara Harff, we now know “little about what types of crises with what
magnitude are likely to occur.”212
According to Ted Gurr, “Geographer Bernard Nietshmann estimates that there are
three thousand to five thousand ‘nations’ in the world, defined as communities whose
shared identity is based on common ancestry, institutions, beliefs, language, and
territory.”213 Gurr identified at least 233 groups that may be at risk.214 Heidenrich
suggested that “there are a very large number of hate groups worldwide, only a fraction
of whom will ever become a major political menace….”215
To illustrate the difficulty of predicting future genocides, Daniel Polsby and Don
B. Kates wrote about a thought experiment suggested by Robert Cottrol:
Let us travel by some means back in time to the year 1900, and there
convene a committee of the most exalted thinkers from all over the world.
We inform them that within fifty years a great and cultured nation will try
to exterminate, with near success, one of its most important ethnic, racial,
or religious minorities. We now ask them to forecast who the victim group
and the perpetrator nation will be. Would any predict the holocaust?”
Among genocide scholars to whom this hypothetical question was posed were Ted
Robert Gurr and Rudolf Rummel. But in no case was the Germany of 1900 predicted as
the perpetrator of the Holocaust. 216 The prospects of twentieth-century U.S. genocide
against blacks or Indians, or Russian genocide against the Jews, or even English genocide
against the Irish would have seemed, to a well-informed person in the year 1900, far
more likely than German genocide against the Jews.
As an empirical matter, Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership (JPFO)
may be correct that if every family in the world owned a good-quality rifle, then genocide
would disappear. In the JPFO scenario of a gun in every household, it is possible that
there would be more killings because of arguments between neighbors, and various other
quotidian disputes, because a deadly weapon was nearby. On the other hand, some
cultures, such as the Swiss, have pervasive arms ownership, but very little violence.217
Even if one makes the direst assumptions about increased mortality as a result of
increased firearms ownership, the net gain in lives would seem to be very large. Mass
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killings require the kind of mass organization that only a government can provide; during
the twentieth century, genocide killed over 170 million people. 218
Yet although widespread armament might make sense as an anti-genocide policy,
we do not in this Article argue that international anti-genocide law, in its current stage of
development, forbids gun prohibition within a particular nation. Rather, we argue that
international law, as it presently exists, forbids the denial of arms to people currently
suffering from genocide. We also agree with the dissenting judges for the 1951 I.C.J.
opinion, that “the enormity of the crime of genocide can hardly be exaggerated, and any
treaty for its repression deserves the most generous interpretation.”219 Accordingly, the
fundamental human right of self-defense against genocide should be applied to cases
where genocide has reached the extermination stage, and also to cases where genocide
preparation has begun.

VIII. Conclusion
Kofi Annan spoke eloquently: “Throughout the world, the victims of violence and
injustice are waiting; waiting for us to keep our word. They notice when we use words to
mask inaction. They notice when laws that should protect them are not applied….Let our
generation not be found wanting.”220
Sadly, the anti- genocide promise “Never Again!” is a worthless platitude. Half a
century after the international community made the Genocide Convention into binding
international law, overt genocide is being perpetrated in Sudan. As with every other
genocide in the last half-century, the international community, including the United
Nations, has been collectively unwilling to take action which would stop the genocide.
The UN has consistently ignored its legal and moral obligations to prevent
genocide, clearly laid out in one of its founding documents. Ten years from now, instead
of apologizing for Srebrenica and Rwanda, the UN will be apologizing for its failure in
Darfur.221
Kofi Annan, expressing grief at the UN’s failure to protect seven thousand
unarmed men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995, stated:
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When the international community makes a solemn promise to safeguard and
protect innocent civilians from massacre, then it must be willing to back its
promise with the necessary means. Otherwise, it is surely better not to raise hopes
and expectations in the first place, and not to impede whatever capability they
may be able to muster in their own defense.222
Secretary-General Annan is precisely right. The civilized world, by ratifying the
Genocide Convention, made “a solemn promise to safeguard and protect innocent
civilians from massacre.” Yet the civilized world has failed its legal obligation “to
prevent” genocide. Accordingly, the world has a duty “not to impede whatever capability
they [the genocide victims] may be able to muster in their own defense.”
When the Genocide Convention was being drafted, the Czechoslovak delegate
noted with regret that the Convention could not really prevent genocide.223 The delegate
was correct in his prediction that nations could not, as a practical matter, be forced to
affirmatively act on their legal duty “to prevent” genocide. However, it may be a simpler
matter to persuade governments, including law enforcement officers and courts, simply to
follow their passive legal duty not to interfere with self-defense against genocide.
In this Article, we have shown that, under existing international law, genocide
victims are not obliged to wait for foreign governments or world organizations to rescue
them. According to normative principles of international law and according to positive
international law, genocide victims have a fundamental human right to use armed force to
resist genocide. Because the prohibition of genocide is a preemptory jus cogens norm of
international law, any local, national, or international laws or government actions which
interfere with self-defense by genocide victims are necessarily unlawful. In particular,
arms control laws which may be generally valid may not be enforced against genocide
victims or against persons who supply arms to genocide victims; enforcement would
make the enforcing court or other state agency complicit in genocide.
Accordingly, the Security Council 2005 arms embargo on Sudan may not lawfully
be enforced so as to deny defensive arms to the genocide victims in Darfur. The new UN
Protocol against firearms trafficking and manufacturing is equally inapplicable to arms
acquisition by genocide victims, including the Darfur victims. All future international
small arms control treaties should explicitly recognize that the treaty does not (and, as a
matter of existing international law, can not) apply so as to prevent genocide victims
from acquiring and using defensive arms.
Any interference—including interference under color of law—with the selfdefense rights of genocide victims constitutes a grave violation of the most fundamental
of all international and moral laws.
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